



MONTHLY ANALYTICAL BRIEF · AUGUST 2026

98 Incidents, 10 FIRs, 5 Arrests

What August 2026 Shows About Anti-Muslim Hate and the
State's Response to It

Based on incidents independently documented and verified by the JEM
monitoring team

SEPTEMBER 2026



A NOTE ON THE DATA

The 98 incidents in this brief are cases JEM's monitoring team could independently identify, verify and document in August 2026. This is a record of what JEM could confirm, not a count of every anti-Muslim hate incident that occurred in India that month.

Cases that went unreported, that surfaced but could not be traced to a verifiable source, or that came to light only after this fact sheet was compiled are not included here. The real scale of anti-Muslim hate incidents in August 2026 is almost certainly larger than 98, possibly by a wide margin. Every figure and pattern discussed below describes the verified sample JEM was able to document. It should not be mistaken for an upper limit on what actually happened.

READING THE FIGURES

98 is a floor, not a ceiling. Every proportion in this brief is computed against the 98 verified incidents, not against an estimate of the true total.

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SECTION ONE

FROM 98 INCIDENTS TO FIVE ARRESTS

In August 2026, JEM's monitoring team documented and verified 98 incidents of hate directed at Muslims across 17 States and Union Territories of India. Of those 98 verified incidents, a First Information Report was confirmed as registered in 10. A confirmed arrest followed in 5. That gap is the subject of this brief.

In most of the cases documented here the record ends with the incident itself. Nothing further appears on it.

FIGURE 1

From documented incident to confirmed arrest (August 2026, all 98 documented incidents)




Figure 1. Of 98 documented incidents, more than a third were classified as hate speech or incitement. Roughly 1 in 10 produced a confirmed FIR, and about 1 in 20 a confirmed arrest.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026 (all 98 verified incidents).

“98 documented incidents. 37 Acts of Hate. 10 confirmed FIRs. 5 confirmed arrests. The gap between the first number and the last is the story of August 2026.”

SECTION TWO

A GEOGRAPHY OF CONCENTRATION

Nearly one in every two incidents documented anywhere in India in August 2026 was recorded in a single State. Uttar Pradesh accounted for 44 of the 98 cases, or 44.9% of the national total. Add Delhi (9 cases), West Bengal (7) and Uttarakhand (6), and four jurisdictions together account for 67.3% of everything JEM verified this month.

FIGURE 2

State-wise distribution of documented incidents (all 98 incidents, across 17 States and UTs)




Figure 2. State-wise distribution of the 98 documented August incidents.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026.

Uttar Pradesh's 44 incidents are not concentrated in a single kind of harm. They span hate speech, mob assault, demolitions of religious and educational structures, Kanwar Yatra-linked economic targeting and police inaction, in roughly the same proportions as the national dataset.

The duties involved here are constitutional, not administrative. Article 355 places a duty on the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance. The corresponding preventive duty on state machinery does not arise from the text of Article 21 alone; it derives from the Supreme Court's reading of Article 21 in *Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India* (2018) 9 SCC 501, which treats the prevention of foreseeable mob violence, and not merely its recording afterward, as a state obligation, and issues binding directions to that end.

SECTION THREE

SIX CATEGORIES, ONE UNDERLYING PATTERN

JEM's taxonomy sorts the 98 incidents into six categories. Acts of Hate, covering speech, slogans, threats and calls for violence, is the largest at 37 cases (37.8%). Acts of Violence follows at 27 cases (27.6%). Together they account for nearly two-thirds of the month's record: direct hostility or physical harm rather than administrative or structural discrimination.

FIGURE 3

Distribution of documented incidents by category (all 98 incidents)




Figure 3. Distribution of the 98 documented incidents by category.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026.

Hate speech as an early warning indicator

When speech promotes disharmony between religious groups, it engages Section 196 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the provision that replaced Section 153A of the old Indian Penal Code on 1 July 2024 and now explicitly covers incitement carried out through electronic communication. When speech threatens injury to a person, their reputation or their property, Section 351 BNS on criminal intimidation applies. In the most serious cases, such as the genocidal rhetoric recorded in Gaya, Bihar on 11 August, the closer statutory fit is Section 197(1)(c) BNS on assertions prejudicial to national integration, which carries forward Section 153B IPC and reaches assertions that a religious community should be denied its rights as citizens, together with Section 353(2) BNS on statements made with intent to promote enmity or ill-will between groups. On the constitutional limits, the governing authority is *Amish Devgan v. Union of India* (2021) 1 SCC 1, in which the Court declined to quash FIRs registered under Sections 153A, 295A and 298 IPC and set out a framework for identifying hate speech, holding that Article 19(1)(a) does not protect speech deliberately and maliciously aimed at outraging religious feelings or at denying a group its equal standing as citizens.

The dataset also shows a sequence. Hate speech rarely stayed confined to a single statement. The clearest pattern to emerge from August is a recurring escalation: speech, then threat, then mobilisation, then intimidation, then violence. It shows most starkly in the Maulana Sajid Rashidi bounty case and the Mohammed Imroze lynching, where an unverified allegation came before a mob assembled rather than after. Recorded only as an offence after the fact, hate speech understates the risk it carries. Read as a leading indicator, it is one of the few warnings available to monitoring bodies and to the police before an incident becomes a death. This sequence is not unique to India, and it matches what researchers of communal violence have described for decades.

Violence, and the provision written for it

This category covers mob assault, lynching, sexual violence, vandalism, cow-related violence and Kanwar-linked attacks. In its most serious form it is now governed by Section 103(2) BNS, a provision with no direct antecedent in the old Penal Code. It specifically criminalises murder committed by five or more people acting on grounds of a victim's race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language or personal belief, and it prescribes death or life imprisonment for every member of the group. The offence it describes, organised and identity-motivated mob killing, is the recurring fact pattern in this dataset. Whether investigators charge under Section 103(2) or fall back on the general murder provision in Section 103(1) is therefore a specific and checkable test of how the law is being applied in each lynching case.

Discrimination, religious spaces, and the categories where the state is the actor

Discrimination, Exclusion and Prejudice and Attacks on Religious Spaces each account for 11 cases (11.2%). The first covers economic exclusion and pressure on Muslim-owned businesses, which engages Article 15's prohibition on religious discrimination and Article 19(1)(g)'s guarantee of the right to trade, a right directly at stake whenever a business is forced to close under communal pressure rather than lawful regulation. The second covers mosque and madrasa incidents, mazar vandalism and the demolition of religious and educational structures, which engages Sections 298 and 299 BNS and the Article 25 and 26 guarantees of religious freedom.

State-Sponsored Discrimination and Police Atrocities each account for 6 cases (6.1%). These are smaller in number but different in kind, because here the alleged actor is the state itself. Administrative action against Muslim individuals, businesses or institutions engages Article 14's equality guarantee and Article 21's protection of livelihood, recognised as part of the right to life in *Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation* (1985) 3 SCC 545. Police inaction has a legal character too. The Supreme Court's Constitution Bench in

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 held that FIR registration on a cognizable complaint is not discretionary, and Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 now carries that duty forward. On that authority, a documented failure to register an FIR is a breach of a binding statutory duty.

SECTION FOUR

THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP, IN THE STATE'S OWN NUMBERS

Of the 98 documented incidents, a confirmed FIR was registered in 10, or 10.2%. A confirmed arrest followed in 5, or 5.1%.

FIGURE B · ADDED VISUAL

The accountability gap, incident by incident (all 98 incidents)




Figure B — Each square is one documented incident. The 10 confirmed FIRs are shown as one group, with the 5 confirmed arrests nested inside them. Added for this design; not present in the source manuscript.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026.

The ten confirmed-FIR cases span Kanwar-related vandalism, a lynching, cow-related assault, an assault on a Muslim cleric, a murder, a case of sexual violence, an assault on a semi-nary student, the Palestinian-flag case and the Varanasi meat-shop action. Beyond arrest, the broader record shows police investigation, detention of protesters, deployment of additional forces, mediation, suspension of personnel and, in one notable case, an internal investigation into police negligence.

TABLE 1

Confirmed arrests recorded in the August dataset

CASE	ACTION RECORDED
Cow-related assault on truck driver	3 arrested
Assault on Maulana Mohammad Iqbal	3 arrested
Killing of Sheikh Mohammad Mafik	8 arrested, including a BJP booth president
Chengannur vehicle attack	3 arrested
Mufti Mujeeb case	1 arrested

Table 1. Confirmed arrests recorded in the August dataset.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026.

The most instructive case of the state examining its own conduct this month is the Mohammed Imroze lynching in Chatra, Jharkhand, where police reportedly registered an FIR naming 56 accused, detained 10 people, suspended four of their own personnel and opened an internal investigation into whether officers at the scene failed to intervene. It is one of the few August cases where the state's own conduct, not only the mob's, became a formal subject of scrutiny, and it speaks directly to the preventive duty the Supreme Court set out in *Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India* (2018) 9 SCC 501, the controlling authority on the state's obligation to prevent and respond to mob violence.

That judgment, delivered by a bench of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and D.Y. Chandrachud, directed every State to designate a nodal officer of at least the rank of Superintendent of Police in each district to prevent vigilante violence, to register FIRs promptly on receiving lynching-related information, and to ensure fast-tracked trials. These directions bind all state authorities under Article 141. In July 2023, hearing a follow-up petition, the Court directed the Union Home Ministry to convene state department heads and ordered States to file year-wise data since 2018 on complaints received, FIRs registered and chargesheets filed; in October 2023 counsel told the Court that many States had still not done so. Then, on 11 February 2025, in the National Federation of Indian Women petition, a bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K. Vinod Chandran disposed of that litigation. It reaffirmed that the Poonawalla directions remain binding under Article 141, declined to lay down a uniform compensation scheme, and held that it could not monitor compliance across every State and Union Territory from Delhi, leaving aggrieved persons to approach the jurisdictional High Courts. Against that history, August 2026's 10.2% confirmed-FIR rate and 5.1% confirmed-arrest rate measure how far a binding mandate is being carried out, at the point where the Supreme Court has stepped back from monitoring it.


SECTION FIVE

READING AUGUST AGAINST THE WIDER EVIDENCE

A single month of data carries limited weight on its own. It becomes more useful when set against the research literature on communal violence in India, and against what other independent monitors have recorded where official data is absent.

How recurring communal violence is organised

The political scientist Paul Brass spent much of his career studying recurring Hindu-Muslim violence in the north Indian city of Aligarh, and concluded that where communal violence keeps recurring in the same place, it is rarely spontaneous. Brass described what he called an institutionalised riot system, in which specific actors play recurring roles across three phases: a long preparation phase in which so-called "fire tenders" keep communal tension alive through small provocations, an activation phase in which a triggering incident is used to mobilise a crowd, and an explanation phase afterward in which responsibility is deliberately blurred so that no single organiser is held to account. Brass argued that the people who ultimately benefit from this cycle are often political actors rather than the participants in the violence itself.



Paul Brass, American political scientist

That framework maps closely onto what the August dataset shows. The bounty announcement against Maulana Sajid Rashidi, the escalating threats around the Kanwar Yatra, and the

FIGURE A · ADDED VISUAL**Brass's institutionalised riot system, as a three-phase cycle**

Figure A — A visual restatement of the three phases described in the text. Added for this design; not present in the source manuscript.

Source: Paul R. Brass, *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India* (2003), as summarised in this brief.

diffuse mix of named organisations, unnamed vigilantes and pilgrims recorded across the month all fit a pattern Brass would recognise: provocation building over weeks, a flashpoint, and then a fog of contested responsibility that makes prosecution difficult. Ashutosh Varshney, writing around the same period as Brass, offered a complementary argument: cities and towns with strong everyday ties between Hindus and Muslims, business associations, trade unions, neighbourhood groups that cut across religious lines, tend to recover from provocation faster and see less violence, while places with weaker cross-community ties are more vulnerable to exactly this kind of escalation. Read together, the two arguments locate the risk in a combination of political conditions and the strength of the everyday civic ties Varshney identified as protective.

Speech, silence and the shape of escalation

In 1954 the psychologist Gordon Allport proposed a scale describing how prejudice escalates when it goes unchallenged: from casual derogatory talk, to avoidance, to active discrimination, to physical violence, and in the most extreme cases to extermination. Each stage, in Allport's account, makes the next one easier to normalise. The scale is frequently conflated with the Anti-Defamation League's Pyramid of Hate, a later model influenced by Allport but distinct from his account. The scale is not a predictive instrument, and India's situation is its own. Its underlying logic, that unanswered speech makes the next step easier, runs through the August record: a bounty announced on video, a cleric threatened with trespass, a truck driver assaulted over a damaged idol. None of these occurred in isolation. Each sat within a climate the previous incident had helped normalise.

What happens when official data goes missing

The caveat that 98 is a floor rather than a ceiling reflects a documented gap in India's own official statistics. The National Crime Records Bureau added new sub-heads covering mob

lynching, hate crime and cow-related violence to its collection schedule after the wave of lynchings in 2015 and 2016. It collected the data and then did not publish it. When *Crime in India 2017* finally appeared on 21 October 2019, a full year behind schedule, those heads were missing; the Home Ministry confirmed that data under roughly twenty-five newly created crime heads — among them mob lynching, hate crime and offences under cow-protection laws — had been withheld on the ground that it was unreliable and its definitions prone to misinterpretation. In July 2018 the Minister of State for Home Affairs had already told Parliament that the Bureau maintains no separate data on lynching. Independent trackers filled the gap. IndiaSpend's cow-related violence database recorded 63 incidents and 28 deaths between 2010 and 25 June 2017, of whom 24 — 86% — were Muslim, with 97% of the attacks reported after May 2014; its wider Hate Crime Watch tracker logged 254 religiously motivated incidents, 91 deaths and 579 injuries between 2009 and 2018. Human Rights Watch documented at least 44 people killed, 36 of them Muslims, in cow-vigilante attacks across twelve States between May 2015 and December 2018, with around 280 people injured in more than a hundred incidents across twenty States.

JEM's position is the same. When the body responsible for a national count stops publishing one, the counting passes to whoever will carry it, with whatever resources are available. The 98 verified incidents in this brief belong to that tradition: a record kept because no official one is.

SECTION SIX

FIVE CASES, FIVE MECHANISMS

Numbers describe a pattern. They do not show how it works in a particular place. The five cases that follow show five distinct mechanisms at work in August: vigilante killing, economic and religious targeting, hate-speech escalation, communal stereotyping and cow vigilantism.

CASE ONE

Mohammed Imroze: From an Unverified Allegation to a Mob Killing

CHATRA, JHARKHAND, 4 AUGUST 2026

Mohammed Imroze, a Muslim man, was allegedly attacked and killed by a mob of roughly 100 to 150 people after an unverified allegation that a minor girl had been raped, an allegation that has never been judicially established. The mob reportedly entered the family home, tied up Imroze's parents, and beat him with sticks and stones. He later died of his injuries. The perpetrators are recorded as a non-state mob with no confirmed organisational affiliation.



Mohammed Imroz (Right) Mohammad Sultan (Left), Chatra, Jharkhand

The FIR reportedly named 56 accused, of whom 10 were detained. Four police personnel were separately suspended amid allegations that they were present at the scene and failed to intervene. If proven, the killing falls under Section 103(2) BNS, murder by five or more persons acting on grounds of community or belief, rather than the general murder provision.

KEY ISSUE: vigilante justice, the presumption of innocence, and police accountability for failing to prevent foreseeable mob violence.

CASE TWO

Mohammad Salman: A Biryani Shop Demolished After Vigilante Pressure

BAHERI, BAREILLY, UTTAR PRADESH, 8 AUGUST 2026

Mohammad Salman, a vendor of chicken biryani, was reportedly confronted by activists linked to Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad during the Sawan month over his sale of non-vegetarian food. Police detained Salman, and municipal authorities then demolished part of his shop, characterised as unauthorised construction.

The case sequences four distinct forms of pressure within days of one another: religious vigilantism, food-based economic targeting, police detention and municipal demolition. It shows how informal communal policing of a livelihood can convert into formal state action against the same target.



Muhammad Salman's biryani shop demolished in Baheri, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh.

KEY ISSUE: the intersection of religious vigilantism, food-based targeting, economic discrimination and administrative enforcement.

CASE THREE

The Rs 11-Lakh Bounty Against Maulana Sajid Rashidi

GHAZIABAD, UTTAR PRADESH, 8 AUGUST 2026

A right-wing activist identified as Ayush Tyagi allegedly announced an Rs 11-lakh bounty against Muslim cleric Maulana Sajid Rashidi in a viral video, amid a controversy connected to the Kanwar Yatra. Hindu Raksha Dal is separately recorded as having threatened violence and attempted trespass against the same cleric.

A public bounty against a named religious leader fall squarely within Section 351 BNS on criminal intimidation and, depending on its reach, Section 196 BNS on promoting enmity between groups. Its circulation on video also squarely engages the electronic-communication ground the BNS added to the old Section 153A. It shows how contested speech during a high-visibility religious observance can turn, within days, from disagreement into a publicised threat against a named individual.

KEY ISSUE: hate speech, incitement, and the targeting of religious leadership.



Ayush Tyagi announces a ₹11 lakh bounty against Maulana Sajid Rashidi.

CASE FOUR

An Independence Day Programme Turns Muslim Dress Into a Prop

KNOWLEDGE BEAM ACADEMY, GONDA, UTTAR PRADESH, AUGUST 2026

Students at a school in Gonda were reportedly made to perform in burqas and niqabs during an Independence Day programme, dancing to songs later described as vulgar. Video of the performance circulated widely and drew public criticism. Authorities subsequently found the school lacked official recognition, and took administrative action on that basis.

The significance of this case lies less in any single legal provision than in what it shows about communal stereotyping in an explicitly nationalist setting. Using an item of religious dress associated with Muslim women as a costume for comic or sexualised performance, on a day meant to mark national unity, turns Muslim identity into spectacle rather than treating it as an equal part of the nation being celebrated.

KEY ISSUE: communal stereotyping and the use of Muslim identity as spectacle in a national civic setting.

CASE FIVE

A Muslim Couple Humiliated Over an Alleged Beef Transport

BHUBANESWAR, ODISHA, AUGUST 2026



Muslims portrayed as terrorists during an Independence Day celebration.

A Muslim couple were allegedly stopped by self-styled cow vigilantes identified with Gau Raksha Dal on suspicion of transporting beef, then physically humiliated and forced to chant Hindu religious slogans. No confirmed FIR or arrest was recorded in this case.



Muslim couple harassed by cow vigilantes over suspected beef transport.

The case illustrates the absence of confirmed accountability that runs through most of the August dataset: a coercive and unlawful private detention produced no recorded state response. Forcing a person to chant the slogans of a faith not their own is, on its face, a direct violation of the freedom of conscience guaranteed under Article 25, and here that violation went unanswered entirely.

KEY ISSUE: cow vigilantism, coerced religious performance, and impunity.

SECTION SEVEN

THE KANWAR YATRA AS A SEASONAL CONCENTRATION

Sixteen of the 98 August incidents (16.3%) were directly linked to the Kanwar Yatra or the wider Sawan and Shravan observance period. They were not uniform. The record shows at least seven distinct mechanisms converging within the same seasonal window: physical violence, economic targeting of food businesses, threats and intimidation, administrative demolition, hate speech, provocation at religious sites, and property damage.



No single organisation dominates this cluster. Instead, the pattern reflects a mix of organised Hindutva formations, participants in a religious pilgrimage, unidentified vigilantes and, in two cases, state administrative authorities acting inside the same communal atmosphere. That diffusion is itself an accountability problem, since a loosely organised set of actors is harder to hold legally responsible than a single named group. The state's duty to register FIRs and investigate under Section 173 BNSS is independent and non-discretionary, and does not depend on whether a perpetrator organisation can be named.

FIGURE 4

Named organisational affiliation, where the incident record identifies one (all 98 incidents)




Figure 4. Named affiliation, where the incident record identifies one. Bajrang Dal, Gau Raksha Dal and unnamed Hindutva-aligned groups account for the majority of the 26.5% of cases with an identified organisational link.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026. Affiliation is recorded only where the incident record names it.

Affiliation appears here only where the incident record names it, and is not inferred from the presumed ideological leaning of an individual perpetrator.

SECTION EIGHT

ADMINISTRATIVE DEMOLITIONS AND THE "BULLDOZER JUSTICE" STANDARD

The August dataset records demolition or anti-encroachment action affecting Muslim businesses, religious structures and educational institutions in at least seven locations: a disputed religious structure in Mussoorie, Mohammad Salman's biryani shop in Baheri, Bareilly, twelve meat, chicken and fish shops in Varanasi, part of M.J.P. Inter College in Moradabad, the Madrasa Arabia Zia-ul-Uloom in Siddharthnagar, the home of a murder accused in Shahjahanpur, and the Darul Uloom Rahmania Madrasa in Muzaffarnagar.

These actions sit against a specific, binding legal standard. On 13 November 2024, a two-judge Supreme Court bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan held, in *In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures* (2024 INSC 866), that the executive "cannot become a judge" and punish a person by demolishing their property simply because they are an accused, or even a convict, in a criminal case, and that demolishing a shared family



Authorities demolish a 59-year-old madrasa in Siddharthnagar, Uttar Pradesh.

structure over one resident's alleged offence amounts to collective punishment of the whole household. The judgment set mandatory, pan-India conditions: a prior show-cause notice of defined minimum length, grounds specified in writing, a personal hearing before a designated authority, a reasoned final order, digital recording of the process on a public portal, and personal accountability for officials who do not comply.

Two cases in this dataset approach the fact pattern the judgment was written to prohibit: the Bareilly biryani shop, demolished in apparent sequence with vigilante pressure and police detention, and the Shahjahanpur demolition of a murder accused's home.

SECTION NINE

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE DOCUMENTED INCIDENTS

Only 19 of the 98 documented incidents (19.4%) were recorded as receiving mainstream media coverage. Alternative media outlets recorded marginally broader coverage, at 24 cases (24.5%). These figures describe coverage recorded specifically in JEM's monitoring database, not an exhaustive count of every outlet in India: the media fields capture only the sources identified during documentation, one case has a blank media field, and the two categories are not mutually exclusive and

cannot be added together. The remaining 79 incidents (80.6%) had no mainstream coverage recorded.

FIGURE 5

Recorded media coverage in the two tracked categories (all 98 incidents)




Figure 5. Recorded media coverage in the two tracked categories, out of 98 documented incidents.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026.

Even with that caveat, the pattern supports a plain argument: the incidents most likely to affect vulnerable communities at the local level are also the incidents least likely to receive sustained national attention. That gap is exactly what systematic, non-partisan documentation exists to fill, not as a substitute for journalism, but as a record that persists whether or not a national camera crew ever arrives.

SECTION TEN

CONSOLIDATED LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The provisions below recur throughout this brief and are gathered here for reference. All statutory citations reflect the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the three codes that came into force on 1 July 2024 and apply to offences committed on or after that date.

Constitutional provisions

Article 14: equality before the law and equal protection of the laws

FIGURE C · ADDED VISUAL

Mainstream coverage against the month's full record (all 98 incidents)




Figure C — Each square is one documented incident. Added for this design; not present in the source manuscript.

Source: JEM monitoring database, August 2026.

Article 15:	prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
Article 19(1)(a):	freedom of speech and expression, subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2)
Article 19(1)(g):	freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business
Article 21:	protection of life and personal liberty, held to include the right to shelter, livelihood and dignity
Articles 25 to 26:	freedom of conscience and religious practice; the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs
Article 141:	Supreme Court law is binding on all courts and authorities in India
Article 355:	the Union's duty to protect states against internal disturbance

Key statutory provisions (BNS 2023, with prior IPC reference)

TABLE 2

OFFENCE	BNS SECTION	PRIOR IPC SECTION
Murder	103(1)	302
Murder by group of five or more, on identity grounds	103(2)	No direct antecedent
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder	105	304
Voluntarily causing hurt	115	323
Rioting	191	146 to 147
Criminal intimidation	351	503, 506
Promoting enmity between groups	196	153A
Assertions prejudicial to national integration	197	153B
Defiling a place of worship to insult religion	298	295
Deliberate or malicious acts to outrage religious feelings	299	295A
Acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India	152	124A (sedition), repealed — 152 is a narrower, distinct offence
FIR registration on a cognizable offence (BNSS)	173 (BNSS)	154 (CrPC)
Statements promoting enmity or ill-will between groups	353(2)	505(2)

Table 2 — Key statutory provisions (BNS 2023, with prior IPC reference).

Source: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Binding judicial precedent

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1:

mandatory FIR registration on receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence

***Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India*, (2018) 9 SCC 501:**

preventive, remedial and punitive directions on mob lynching and cow vigilantism, binding under Article 141

***Amish Devgan v. Union of India*, (2021) 1 SCC 1:**

limits of Article 19(1)(a) protection for speech intended to outrage religious feelings

***Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation*, (1985) 3 SCC 545:**

the right to livelihood as part of the right to life under Article 21

***In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures*, 2024 INSC 866:**

mandatory notice, hearing, reasoned order and official accountability before any demolition connected to an accused or convicted person

SECTION ELEVEN

WHAT THE EVIDENCE POINTS TOWARD

The recommendations below follow directly from the accountability gaps traced in this brief. They are organised by the actor best placed to close each one.

Law enforcement and district administration

- Ensure strict, verifiable compliance with the *Lalita Kumari* mandate: every complaint disclosing a cognizable offence under BNS results in FIR registration under Section 173 BNSS, with delays justified in writing.
- Operationalise the *Tehseen Poonawalla* nodal-officer framework in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, West Bengal and Uttarakhand, with monthly public reporting of FIRs and chargesheets in hate-crime and mob-violence cases.
- In every case involving five or more alleged perpetrators acting on grounds of a victim's identity, assess and record whether Section 103(2) BNS applies, rather than defaulting to Section 103(1).
- Investigate and publicly report on cases, such as Mohammed Imroze's, where police were present at mob violence but did not intervene, treating this as a distinct category of institutional failure.

Municipal and demolition authorities

- Issue no demolition order affecting a Muslim-owned business, residence or religious or educational structure without documented compliance with the show-cause, hearing and reasoned-order requirements set out in the November 2024 judgment.
- Maintain and publish the mandated digital demolition-tracking portal in every district where demolitions were recorded this month.

- Treat demolitions that follow immediately upon vigilante pressure, as in the Baheri case in Bareilly district, as requiring heightened procedural scrutiny.

State governments

- Publish consolidated, quarterly hate-crime data broken down by district, offence category and outcome, so the accountability gap identified in this brief can be independently checked.
- Issue standing instructions distinguishing lawful food-vending regulation from vigilante-driven closure of minority-owned businesses during religious observance periods.
- Extend victim compensation and rehabilitation, consistent with *Tehseen Poonawalla*, to victims and families in the confirmed lynching, assault and demolition cases identified here.

National human rights institutions and the judiciary

- The National Human Rights Commission should take suo motu cognizance of the Mohammed Imroze case and of the demolition pattern identified in this brief.
- Because the Supreme Court disposed of the National Federation of Indian Women compliance petition in February 2025 and directed aggrieved persons to the jurisdictional High Courts, consolidated district-wise compliance data of the kind gathered here should be placed before the relevant High Courts and State Human Rights Commissions, rather than in the Supreme Court, where the compliance petition is no longer pending.

Media and civil society

- Given the 80.6% mainstream-media non-coverage rate identified above, build partnerships with regional and district-level journalists in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, West Bengal and Uttarakhand, and in States where few cases surfaced this month, since a low documented count may reflect limited local reporting rather than an absence of incidents.
- Sustain and expand independent, source-verified incident documentation, which remains the only systematic record of cases that receive little coverage elsewhere.
- Report organisational affiliation only where the incident record names it, so that findings remain credible and usable in legal proceedings.

SECTION TWELVE

CONCLUSION: A GAP THAT PERSISTS UNTIL IT IS MEASURED

August 2026 documents a familiar and troubling cycle: communal rhetoric, religious vigilantism, social intimidation and administrative action intersecting across 98 verified incidents in 17 states and Union Territories, with Uttar Pradesh accounting for nearly half of everything documented, a share that reflects where cases surfaced.

The most significant finding this month is not any single case, however serious, but the cumulative gap between the scale of documented hate and the state's verified response to it: a 37.8% share of incidents classified as Acts of Hate, against a 10.2% confirmed-FIR rate and a 5.1% confirmed-arrest rate. That gap sits against a specific and binding judicial mandate, laid out in *Tehseen Poonawalla* and reaffirmed in the November 2024 demolition guidelines, that has not yet been fully carried out on the state's own admission to the Supreme Court.

Readers should carry one qualification through everything above: 98 is a floor, not a ceiling. It is the number of incidents JEM's team could independently verify and document in a single month, using the sources and methods available to an independent monitoring effort. It is not a claim that no more than 98 incidents occurred. Incidents that receive no confirmed legal response and no mainstream media coverage do not, for that reason, stop having happened. They simply become invisible to public accountability mechanisms unless someone independently and carefully writes them down. That is the argument, made again every month, for continuing to do exactly that.

SECTION THIRTEEN

A NOTE ON SOURCES

The scholarly and comparative material referenced in this brief draws on the following works and reports:

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